出口海陆仓融资质押率优化

Optimization on Loan-to-value Ratios of Exporting Offshore/In-transit Inventory Financing

出口海陆仓融资对促进海运贸易和供应链金融发展具有重要的现实意义,其质押率优化是融资风险管理和控制决策的关键。本文针对需求波动条件下的出口海陆仓融资质押率优化问题,应用双重Stackelberg博弈原理,分析构造了船公司、出口商、进口商之间四种博弈策略下的总利润函数,以供应链总利润最大化为目标,构建了质押率分段函数优化模型,在论证了质押率最优解存在的基础上,采用反向推理法设计了求解步骤。算例验证了模型的适用性和有效性,结果表明,船公司最优质押率与出口商最佳交货提前期、进口商最优订货批量均呈负相关关系,质押货物市场售价越高,最优质押率越低。在进口商质押货物进货价上升或出口商原材料购买价格下降时,提高存货融资质押率,有助于提高海运贸易供应链的整体利益。

Exporting offshore/in-transit inventory financing means that the bank regards the shipping company's credit guarantee as a condition,and commissions the shipping company to supervise and transport pledged goods throughout the entire journey(offshore warehouse,in transit,to the destination warehouse).It's a new inventory mortgaging/financing mode with worldwide credit,which can not only relieve exporters in terms of a shortage of funds,but can also bring new types of profit growth points for banks and shipping companies.Exporting offshore/in-transit inventory financing has practical significance for promoting the development of seaborne trade and supply chain finance.The optimization of its loan-to-value ratio,namely the ratio of loan principal and the value of the pledged goods,is the key to manage and control the risk.According to the process of exporting offshore/in-transit inventory financing,the trading decisions of the shipping company,exporter and importer reflect the relationship of a double Stackelberg Game strategy.The first game occurs between the shipping company and exporter.The shipping company sets the loan-to-value ratio rfirst,and then the exporter determines the delivery lead time Laccordingly.Therefore,the shipping company is the leader,and the exporter is the follower in the game.The second game takes place between the exporter and the importer.The exporter sets the delivery lead time Lfirst,and then the importer determines the order quantities Qaccordingly.Therefore,the exporter is the leader and the importer is the follower in the game.In international seaborne trade,demand fluctuations will affect the value of pledged goods,which may result in non-compliance.When the market price of the pledged goods is higher than the purchase price signed by the importer and exporter,the importer will withdraw the pledged goods normally.Otherwise,the importer and exporter are likely to default,so the shipping company could sell the collateral to make up the loan capital.In this paper,the issue of optimization on loan-to-value ratios of exporting offshore/in-transit inventory financing under uncertain demand is addressed.Based on the theory of double Stackelberg game,the total profit functions under four game strategies among the shipping company,exporter and importer are analyzed and constructed,aiming at maximizing the total profit of the supply chain.The piecewise function optimization model of loan-to-value ratios is established.The existence of optimal loan-to-value ratios is proved.A reverse reasoning method is adopted to solve the model.The solution process is designed as follows:firstly,maximize the profit of the exporter to get the expression of the best delivery lead time L*containing r,secondly,maximize the profit of the importer to get the expression of the economic ordering quantity Q*containing L*,then the optimal loan-to-value ratio r*is solved by maximizing the total profit function.Numerical example is used to verify the applicability and validity of the proposed model.The results indicate that the optimal loan-to-value ratio has a positive correlation with the importer's purchase price,and has a negative correlation with the market price and raw material price of pledged goods,respectively.Therefore,the shipping company should keep a close eye on the price changes of pledged goods,and set a reasonable loan-to-value ratio to increase the total profits of the supply chain.The findings can provide scientific guidance for the optimization of exporting offshore/in-transit inventory financing.