工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

Mechanism of Multi Level Interest Distribution and Incentive Coordination in the Government Supervision of Engineering Quality

实施工程质量政府监督是国际惯例,工程质量政府监督的基本形式是政府主管部门委托工程质量监督机构对工程建设主体的质量行为及其结果的政府监督,其本质是双重委托代理过程。工程质量恶性事故频发,一定程度上反映了工程质量政府执法监督的失责与失效,其根源在于工程质量政府监督者的执法监督内生动力不足。因此,基于工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配的激励协同机制值得探讨。针对工程质量政府监督所形成的政府主管部门、政府质量监督机构、质量监督团队(或小组)等多层次管理系统,通过构建参与各方之间的利益分配函数,构建工程质量政府监督多层次激励协调的博弈模型,从第一阶段的合作博弈和第二阶段的非合作博弈求解与推论。合作博弈可求得其奖励系数为λ_0=1-n/(1+∑n i=1 γ_0~2/γ_i^2),λ_i =1-γ_0~2/γ_i^2 n/(1+∑n i=1 γ_0~2/γ_i^2);非合作博弈可求得求解可得最佳努力协调程度为a_0~*=(λ_0a_0)/2β_0~2研究结果表明:工程质量政府监督者的努力协调程度与协调成本有关,与其固定成本无关;利益分配系数大小不仅取决于工程质量政府监督者的努力协调效率,而且还与其他方的努力协调效率有关;工程质量监督者在增强自身管理能力时,还要关注与其他方的协调,以提高工程质量政府监督的总体绩效。工程质量政府监督合作共赢的激励协调机制策略是:政府质量监督团队应合理设置监督团队,提高协调效率、降低监督协调成本以实现自身激励价值最大化;质量监督团队(或小组)应建立合作伙伴关系,以努力提高协调效率来实现自身激励价值最大化。研究构架的基于多层次利益分配机制的激励协同机理模型与结论,可为一般公共品的市场治理与监管提供理论支撑与实践借鉴。

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice.The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted.Its essence is a dual principal-agent process.The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent.Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision.Therefore,the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored.In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments,government quality supervision organizations,quality supervision team(or group)for the government supervision of engineering quality.The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed,and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built.To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game,the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient:λ0=1-n/(1+∑n i=1 γ02/γi2),λi =1-γ02/γi2 n/(1+∑n i=1 γ02/γi2);a0*=(λ0a0)/2β02.The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non =cooperative game.The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs,and had nothing to do with fixed costs.The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors,but also on the efficiency of other parties’ efforts.The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision.The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly,improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation.Quality supervision team(or group)should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched.It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.