不同权力结构下供应链企业社会责任激励

Stimulatingcorporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chain in Different Dominated Modes

本文以单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链为对象,假设仅考虑供应商对产品安全方面的社会责任,研究了在供应商主导和零售商主导两种权力配置模式下,供应商履行社会责任程度的差异,以及如何在供应商和零售商间建立合理的契约以激励供应商社会责任的履行。研究发现,相对供应商主导,在零售商主导下供应商会更多地履行社会责任。引入收入共享的事后契约和成本共担的事前契约后,在供应商主导下,两种契约在一定条件下均能有效地激励供应商更好地履行社会责任,但在留存比例与分担比例相等的条件下,成本共担契约的激励效应更强。在零售商主导下,收入共享契约虽能激励供应商的社会责任履行,但因导致零售商的利润下降,故无法达成,而成本共担契约只有在分担足够大时才有激励效应。

Most studies addressing the problem of corporate social responsibility(CSR)stimulation of a supply chain assume that supplier dominates the supply chain.However,the tendency appears that the retailing market is becoming more and more concentrated so that the dominance of retailers on the supply chain gets more and more prominent for some industries.Furthermore,suppliers in the supply chains dominated by different parties may have different motivation to engage CSR and prefer different contracts.Therefore,how to motivate supplier to engage inmore social responsibilities under different power structure of supply chain is studied in this paper.A supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer is constructed.Assuming that only the supplier fulfills CSR,the market power structure(retailer-led and supplier-led)is integrated with the supply chain social responsibility incentive contract(revenue-sharing incentive and cost-sharing incentive)choice decision,aiming to maximize the social responsibility under the premise that profits increased for both parties of the supply chain after the contract is introduced.The following findings are contributed.Relative to the supplier-dominated mode,the supplier would undertake more social responsibility in the retailer-dominatedmode.With the introduction of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract,it is found that the cost-sharing contract is more effective even though both contracts are feasible to stimulate suppers’social responsibilities in the supplier-led model.However,in the retailer-dominated mode,the revenue-sharing contract can motivate the suppliers to undertake more corporate social responsibility,but a fails to increase the profit of retailer.The contract can’t thereby be reached.The cost-sharing contract only has a stimulating effect when the sharing rate is big enough,which is inconsistent with the intuition.All the findings are demonstrated by the simulation results.It is revealed,on the one hand,sharing contract can motivate suppliers to fulfill CSR,and on the other hand,it provides implications to motivate suppliers’CSR initiatives for the retailer-led supply chain.