可再生能源配额制、发电厂商的策略行为与演化

Renewable Portfolio Standards,the Strategic Behavior of Power Producers and Evolution

可再生能源配额制(简称配额制),是我国实现能源低碳转型的强制性制度变迁;其成功与否,决定于科学的制度设计。制度具有建构性与演进性,配额制在建构发电厂商策略行为博弈规则的同时,长期中会与发电厂商的策略行为共生演化。本文在构建配额制与发电厂商策略行为演化博弈模型基础上,分析了配额制的相关制度准参数对发电厂商策略行为的影响。结果表明:配额制与发电厂商策略行为的演化博弈均衡,决定于相关的制度准参数(如配额和单位罚金)以及绿色证书市场的交易成本和发电厂商的边际成本差额。其中,科学的配额、较高的单位罚金以及较低的交易成本和边际成本差额,绿色证书市场更为有效,配额制这一强制性制度变迁更易成功;反之反是。因此,科学设计配额制的相关制度准参数并加强其制度环境建设,有助于我国有效施行配额制。

The renewable portfolio standards(RPS)is a mandatory institution change for China to realize the energy low-carbon transition,and its success depends on the scientific institution design.The institution is constructive and evolutionary.RPS will coexist and evolve with power producers’strategic behavior in the long run while constructing the game rules of power producers’strategic behavior.The effects of institution quasi parameter and institutional environment related to the RPS on the strategic behavior of power producers are analyzed,based on the construction of the evolutionary game model between the RPS and the strategic behavior of power producers.The results indicate that the evolution game equilibrium between the RPS and the strategic behavior of power producers mainly depend on the relevant institution quasi parameters(such as quota,unit fine,the transaction cost of tradable green certificate market and the marginal cost margin of power producers).The scientific quota,higher unit fine,lower transaction cost and marginal cost margin can not only make the green certificate market more effective,but also make the mandatory institution change of RPS more successful.Therefore,to design the institution quasi parameters related to the RPS scientifically and strengthen the construction of institutional environment helps China to effectively implement the RPS.