具公平行为的零售商回收闭环供应链动态均衡策略研究

Study on Dynamic Equilibrium Strategy of Closed-loop Supply Chain with Retailers' Fair Behavior and Retailer Recycling

本文研究了一主导制造商(再制造商)和一"嫉妒/自豪"公平关切行为的零售商(回收商)组成的闭环供应链系统的成员动态均衡策略。利用伊藤过程,刻画了闭环供应链系统的废旧品回收率的随机演化过程。基于利润结构,给出了制造商的期望利润目标泛函。基于零售商的"嫉妒/自豪"型模式,构建了零售商的期望效用目标泛函,进而建立了闭环供应链系统的随机微分博弈模型。利用随机微分博弈理论,给出了制造商和零售商最优值函数应满足的偏微分方程组。通过求解该偏微分方程组,获得了制造商和零售商最优值函数,据此得到了制造商的动态均衡批发价格策略以及零售商的动态均衡销售价格与回收投入努力策略。为了掌握废旧品回收率的统计特征,揭示了废旧品回收率的随机演进性质。结合算例,研究了零售商公平关切程度对成员均衡策略以及绩效的影响。结果表明:零售商公平关切程度越高,制造商的均衡批发价格越低,进而导致其最优值函数将减少。与制造商不同,零售商公平关切程度将增加其最优值函数。另外,零售商公平关切程度越高,系统回收率越低。

Manufacturer(remanufacturer)and a retailer(collector)dynamic equilibrium strategies in a closed-loop supply chain system are studied,which consists on a leader,manufacturer(remanufacturer),and a follower,retailer(collector)with'jealousy/pride'fairness-concern behavior.First,the random evolution process of the recovery rate of waste products in closed-loop supply chain system is described by using the ITO process,its expected profit functional is given by manufacturer’s profit structure,andits expected utility functional is constructed based on retailer’s'jealousy/pride'model.Therefore,the stochastic differential game model of closed-loop supply chain system is established.By using stochastic differential game theory,the partial differential equations which the optimal value function of the manufacturer and retailer should be satisfied are given.By solving the partial differential equations,the optimal value function of manufacturer and retailer respectively is obtained.By using optimal value functionofmanufacturer and retailer,manufacturer’s wholesale price dynamic equilibrium strategy is obtained,the retailer’s selling price and recycling investment dynamic equilibrium strategy.In order to grasp the statistical characteristics of the evolution process of waste products,the stochastic evolution nature of recovery of waste products is revealed.By numerical example,impact of retailer’s degree of fairness on agents’equilibrium strategies and performance arestudied.The results show that the higher the retailer’s degree of fairness,the lower the manufacturer’s equilibrium wholesale price and its optimal value.Unlike the manufacturer,the retailer’s degree of fairness will increase its optimal value function.In addition,the higher theretailer’sdegree of fairness,the lower the collecting rate of the system is.