会计信息可比性影响高管薪酬契约的有效性吗?

Does Accounting Information Comparability Affect the Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Contracts?

基于2005-2016年我国A股上市公司数据,本文从薪酬业绩敏感性出发,研究了会计信息可比性对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。研究发现:会计信息可比性的提高增加了高管薪酬业绩敏感性,而这种影响在国有企业中较弱。表明会计信息可比性的提高有助于增加高管薪酬契约的有效性,但国有企业面临的行政干预制约了这种作用。进一步分析则表明,会计信息可比性对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响在信息不对称程度更严重的情况下较大。此外,会计信息可比性的提高降低了高管超额薪酬水平。本文的研究对于全面认识会计信息可比性的契约作用、提升高管薪酬契约有效性具有重要的参考价值。

Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2016,this study examines the impact of accounting information comparability on executive pay-performance sensitivity.We find that the improvement of accounting information comparability increases executive pay-performance sensitivity,which is weaker in state-owned enterprises(SOEs).These results show that the improvement of comparability enhances the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts,but the government intervention faced by SOEs limits the effect.In the further analysis,we show that comparability of accounting information has a greater impact on executive pay-performance sensitivity in the case of more serious information asymmetry.Meanwhile,we find that the improvement of comparability has reduced excess executive compensation.Our paper provides new insights into the contractual role of accounting information comparability and sheds light on how to improve the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts.