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股权激励对上市公司非效率投资行为的影响研究

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摘要 本文将股权激励引入投资效率治理领域,通过两个契约模型研究了不同激励模式下管理层投资决策的行为选择倾向,论证了股权激励能够优化企业投资行为,抑制非效率投资。
作者 陈光
出处 《中国商论》 2014年第3X期88-89,共2页 China Journal of Commerce
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