反收购条款对创新能力的影响:中国上市公司的证据

The Impact of Antitakeover Provisions on Corporate Innovation:Empirical Evidence from China’s Listed Companies

在中国特有的股权结构和治理机制下,上市公司通过反收购条款除了能够稳定股东结构外,是否会影响公司的创新能力呢?本文经手工收集得到1734条反收购条款数据建立上市公司样本,选取2007—2017年A股上市公司面板数据进行实证研究。通过研究我们发现,在公司章程中增设反收购条款与公司在创新中的表现呈负相关,即反收购条款增多,企业创新能力降低。在股权更分散的公司,反收购条款对创新能力的负面影响减小,且对于专利授权较困难的行业,由于资本市场的压力可以抑制管理层道德风险,反收购条款对其创新能力的负向影响也将被削弱。本文根据研究结果提出了相应的政策建议。

Under the unique ownership structure and governance mechanism in China, will the Antitakeover provisions not only stabilize the shareholder structure,but also affect the innovation ability of the listed companies? With the dificiency of related data, we manually collect the 1734 terms of antitakeover provisions, and select the panel data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 to conduct empirical research. The results indicate that adding antitakeover provisions to the company’s articles of association is negatively related to the company’s performance in innovation. That is, as the number of antitakeover provisions increases, the ability of the innovation of the company is reduced;meanwhile in those companies with more dispersed ownership, the adverse effect of antitakeover provisions on the number of patents has been weakened. Moreover, for those industries where patent licensing is difficult,the negative impact of antitakeover provisions on their innovation ability will be weakened because the pressure of capital market can restrain the moral hazard of management. Then we use the method of selecting surrogate variables to conduct robustness tests. We select R&D expenditures to replace the number of patents as a measure of innovation capability. The results are still robust. Finally, we get some policy suggestions.