无功不受禄:上市公司信息披露质量与董秘薪酬激励

No Pains no Gains:Corporate Disclosure Quality and Board Secretary’s Compensation

董秘作为上市公司高级管理人员,其核心职能为负责上市公司信息披露。本文首次考察上市公司信息披露质量对董秘薪酬激励的影响,以此为高管薪酬契约的有效性提供更直接的证据。研究发现,上市公司信息披露质量越好,董秘薪酬越高,并且在距投资者较远、高成长及国有控股公司中,董秘薪酬与信息披露质量的敏感性更高。进一步研究发现,上市公司基于信息披露质量为董秘支付薪酬有助于提升公司价值。上述结果表明,董事会为了对董秘的人力资本进行激励补偿,同时避免与信息披露相关的道德风险问题,可能将信息披露质量作为董秘业绩考核的非财务指标。

As one of the top executives in China’s listed companies,the secretary of boards of directors shall be responsible for information disclosure. We examine whether secretaries’ compensation is related to corporate disclosure quality, and conditions under which the relation should be stronger. The empirical results show that the better the information disclosure of listed companies is, the more pay the board secretaries will get, and the relation is concentrated in firms which are far from investors, firms experiencing higher growth and state-owned enterprises. Further study shows that incorporating disclosure quality into the secretaries’ compensation structure can help to increase firm value. Our study suggests that in order to compensate secretaries for their human capital and address the moral hazard problem associated with information disclosure, boards may use disclosure quality as a non-financial performance measure.