中国式分权下的体制性产能过剩——产量补贴与产能补贴的比较

Institutional Excess Capacity under Chinese Style Decentralization: Quantity vs. Capacity Subsidy

为了分析中国式分权下的体制性产能过剩,本文构建了一个地方政府进行补贴竞争的动态博弈模型。首先区分了地方政府的产量补贴与产能补贴,并在此基础上考察了地方政府是"市场效率导向"型或"辖区GDP导向"型时的体制性产能过剩、社会福利和企业自生能力。分析结果表明:不论是地方政府的产量补贴,还是地方政府的产能补贴,都会使得企业的产能过剩更加严重。进一步研究发现,当地方政府为"辖区GDP导向"型时,地方政府对辖区GDP的重视程度与整体社会福利之间呈倒U型关系,这表明中央政府需要制定合理的地方官员政治晋升规则,使得地方政府之间的竞争有利于提高社会福利。治理体制性产能过剩,既要考虑社会福利效应,也要考虑企业的自生能力效应。

In order to analyze institutional excess capacity under Chinese style decentralization,this paper constructs a dynamic game model of subsidy competition of local governments.This paper distinguishes between the quantity subsidy and the capacity subsidy,and investigates institutional excess capacity,social welfare the firms’viability.The result shows that both quantity subsidy and capacity subsidy will worsen excess capacity.Furthermore,when local governments are jurisdictional GDP oriented,there is an inverted U relationship between the weight assigned to jurisdictional GDP and social welfare.Finally,based on theoretical analysis,this paper puts forward some classified governance measures for institutional excess capacity.