摘要
本文通过引入价格和信息公开度,建立双信号传递模型来研究寡头厂商的价格制定和最优信息公开度等最优决策问题,运用库恩·塔克定理求解最优化问题,试图找出高质量厂商与低质量厂商的分离均衡,结合等利润曲线简要描述分离均衡和混同均衡。文章最后在特例中分析了不完全信息静态博弈,进一步验证了双信号传递模型分析的结论。
This article brings two factors, including prices and information opening degree, to establish a model of double signaling, in order to research the optimization problems, such as the price making process of oligarch company and optimal information opening degree issues. Appling of Kuhn - Tucker theorem to address optimization problem, this article tries to find out the separated equilibrium between high - quality company and low - quality company, and to analyze separated equilibrium and mixed equilibrium through the Ios-profit line. In the end of the article, it analyzes incomplete information in a special circumstance and makes a further evidence for the conclusion of the model of double signaling.
出处
《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》
2006年第1期18-22,共5页
Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
关键词
信号传递
信息公开度
混同均衡
分离均衡
Signaling
Information-opening Degree
Mixed Equilibrium
Separated Equilibrium