信息不对称条件下股利政策的市场反应

The Market Reaction to Dividend Policy Under the Information Asymmetry

股利政策(dividend policy)是指公司税后利润在向股东支付股利与企业内部留存收益之间的分配选择。传统的股利政策是建立在一系列的经典假设条件之下,市场反应信号能够有效地传递公司内部的财务信息。当我们放宽某些假设条件,回到非对称信息的状态下,股利政策的市场反应信号传递是否仍然有效?本文简要阐述了这个产生于有效市场理论的传承和缺陷,并进一步分析了我国上市公司股利政策在非对称信息条件下的市场反应现状。

Dividend policy is the choice of using the profit after taxation to pay for stockholders or to save the inner residual income for the running company. Conventional dividend policy was built on a series of classic hypotheses. The market reaction signal could transfer a company’s inner financial information effectively. When we broaden some hypothesiss, and come back to the state of information asymmetry, does the dividend policy signal of market reaction still transfer effectively? This article expatiates the inherit and limitation under the hypothesis of effective market, and further analyses the actuality of market reaction under information asymmetry of listed companies in China.