摘要
近年来中央和地方政府相继出台了一系列保护环境的激励政策和措施,但效果并不理想。从建立的博弈模型可以看出,地方政府和企业满足于既得利益,不希望变更原已形成的纳什均衡,由此陷入了激励制度瓶颈。为此,必须改变地方政府和企业的动态博弈均衡,从完善信息收集、改进利益组合、选择策略集等博弈过程入手,构造与环境友好型社会相符的新纳什均衡。
In recent years the central and local governments have promulgated a series of incentive policies and measures on environmental protection,but the result is not satisfactory. Seen from the game model,local governments and enterprises only want to get vested interests,not want to change the Nash Equilibrium which has formed. Thus,the incentive system is a failure. Therefore,we should change the dynamic game-balance between the local government and enterprises,build a new Nash Equilibrium coordinate with environment-friendly society from the game process,such as to improve the collec-tion of information,and portfolio interests,and choose a set of strategies.
出处
《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》
2008年第3期77-82,共6页
Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
关键词
治污
激励制度
博弈分析
Pollution Control
Incentive System
Game Analysis
