摘要
由于金融市场的各方主体之间存在着目标上的不一致以及信息不对称现象,实施准人监管的过程成为一个监管当局与金融机构之间博弈的过程。通过建立市场准入监管的博弈模型,分析得出如果要达到促使监管当局选择监管策略,金融机构选择合格策略的目标,应该采取措施降低监管当局实施监管以及金融机构努力达标的各种成本,并且应该建立更完善的金融市场,提高其效率,使得进入金融市场的预期收益提高。
Because of the differences in participants’ targets and the information asymmetry in financial market,the process of entrance permission regulation became a game between the financial market regulator and financial institutions.This paper aims to build a game theory model of financial market entrance permission regulation.It will show that in order to make the regulator choose supervise-strategy and financial institutions choose qualify-strategy,we should take measures to cut the cost of supervision and qualifying.In addition,an improved and more efficient financial market will be needed to increase the expected returns of financial market.
出处
《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》
2009年第3期31-34,共4页
Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
关键词
市场准入
金融监管
博弈
Entrance Permission
Financial Regulation
Game Theory
