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自我实施的机理——读《契约与激励:契约条款在确保履约中的作用》

The Self-Enforcing Mechanism——Reading“Contracts and Incentives:The Role of Contract Terms in Assuring Performance”
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摘要 不完全契约理论认为,如果契约是不完全的,那么就会出现契约当事人事前专用性投资不足的现象。如果投资者在事前做了专用性投资,那么他将有可能面临被对方"敲竹杠"的风险。本杰明.克莱因在《契约与激励:契约条款在确保履约中的作用》一文中强调建立私人自动实施机制有利于防止契约当事人"敲竹杠"的风险,促进契约自我履行。该理论在解释社会现象时也极富张力。 Incomplete contract theory considers that there will be a phenomenon of the prior specific investment insufficient if a contract is incomplete.In this case,the investor will encounter the risk of Rip-off by the other party to the contract.The thesis Contracts and Incentives:the Role of Contract Terms in Assuring Performance written by Benjamin Klein emphasizes that it is the establishing of private self-enforcing mechanism that can prevent the Rip-off risk and promote the contract self-enforcement.When interpreting social phenomena,this theory is also full of tension.
作者 张维强
出处 《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》 2013年第2期152-155,共4页 Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
关键词 不完全契约 敲竹杠 契约条款 私人自动实施机制 Incomplete Contract Rip-off Contract Terms Private Self-enforcing Mechanism
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