摘要
近年来,针对国内外公司违法违规以及上市公司高管团队中法律背景专家人数持续激增现象,在控制了高管团队中会计背景专家后,发现在2009年至2011年,法律背景高管能有效降低企业盈余管理活动。进一步检验表明,无论是国有企业还是非国有企业均存在上述结论,并且国有企业法律背景高管减弱企业盈余管理的结论更加显著。此外,法律背景高管对企业盈余管理活动的影响比会计背景高管要大,这进一步证实了法律背景高管对盈余管理是调控监督功能,而非信号功能。证实了,法律背景高管在公司扮演的是一种"监察者"角色,而非"合谋者"角色。
In view of the phenomenon that executives with legal background continue to surge,we can draw the conclusion that executives with legal background can effectively reduce earning management after controlling the number of accounting experts. Further study shows that this conclusion applies to both states- owned businesses and private en- terprises. In addition,legal- background executives have greater influence on corporate earning management than ac- counting experts,which further confirms the conclusion that legal- background executive is less of an accomplice in company earning management but more of an overseer for the company.
出处
《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》
2013年第5期54-60,共7页
Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
关键词
法律背景专家
会计背景专家
盈余管理
Executive with Legal Background
Accounting Experts
Earning Management
