商品众筹的定价机制

The Pricing Mechanism of Commodity Crowdfunding

众筹是新创企业进行外部融资的一种途径,商品众筹具有筛选出优质客户的功能,从而将消费者分为两种类型。本文以生产者利润最大化为目标函数构造优化模型分析众筹产品的定价机制,为准备通过该模式融资的生产者确定产品价格和筹资额度提供理论支撑。理论分析表明:商品众筹模式有助于打开产品的初期市场,在总销售数量不变时,可增加厂商利润;但由于筹资额度、质量不确定性和信息不对称性的限制,筹资者几乎不能为高质量产品筹集到足够的资金,并且容易出现"柠檬现象"。

Crowdfunding has become an alternative channel for entrepreneurs who are seeking external financing in recent years. It has the ability to tap the right crowd,so the consumers can be divided into two types. This paper analyses the pricing mechanism of this pattern through the profit maximization model. It can provide the theoretical supports such as determining the price of product and making the funding lines for the producers who want to get financing by this way. Through this paper we know commodity crowdfunding can help producers open the market early and expend the profits though total sales number remains same. In the end we analyze the limitations from the perspectives of funding lines,product quality uncertainty and information asymmetry,and we have found the entrepreneurs of commodity crowdfunding almost could not raise enough funds for the high- quality products and it is easy to lead to the "lemon phenomenon".