摘要
本文基于2009—2013年我国上市公司高管薪酬和业绩数据,从管理者权力和管理者人力资本两个角度理论分析并实证检验了企业高管薪酬粘性特征存在的原因。研究发现:(1)管理者权力是造成薪酬粘性特征存在的重要因素,管理者权力越大,其对董事会施加压力从而影响自身薪酬的制定的能力就越大,则薪酬的粘性特征就越明显;(2)管理者人力资本也是影响薪酬粘性特征的重要因子,管理者才能越突出,则董事会更有降低负增长盈余下的薪酬业绩敏感性的倾向。因此,我国上市公司高管薪酬管理需要建立更为完善的与企业业绩挂钩的薪酬管理体系,避免管理者权力过大引起的利益掠夺,但允许以吸引并挽留高品质的管理者为目的的合理程度的薪酬粘性特征的存在。
Based on the data of firm performance and CEO compensation from 2009 to 2013 in China,this paper analysed influence factor of CEO Compensation stickiness,from the view of both managerial power and CEO human capital. Following points are concluded. Firstly,managerial power is an important influence factor of the stickiness,which means that the higher power managers have,the greater pressure they will put on the board to affect their own compensations,and then level of CEO Compensation stickiness will rise. Secondly,CEO human capital is also an important factor of the stickiness. The board will have a tendency to increase the rate of risk- sharing between managers and shareholders if CEO competency is high. Therefore,in order to avoid interest expropriation caused by oversize managerial power,a more comprehensive CEO compensation system related to firm performance is strongly needed. But an appropriate level of stickiness is necessary to attract and retain talented executives.
出处
《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》
2015年第2期96-102,共7页
Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
