莱布尼茨的归纳之思和谜题之解

Leibniz's Thought of Induction and the Solution of Riddle

莱布尼茨先于休谟提出了归纳合理性议题,但人们往往忽视了他的归纳逻辑思想,将其视为一个纯粹的理性主义者。莱布尼兹对归纳的论述广泛地散布在他的诸多著作和手稿中,在归纳辩护上表现出折中主义倾向。他把归纳合理性限定在偶然的似真领域,而归纳合理性依赖一些形而上学的普遍假说原则,既强调经验归纳对于获取事实真理的必要性,同时又采取了理性主义的辩护路径。莱布尼茨在其归纳辩护中提出了假说-演绎法的雏形:"先验猜想方法",闪耀着现代科学的方法论光辉,在宏大的形而上学体系中给经验探究留有一席之地。

Leibniz advanced the inductive rationality before Hume. However, for various reasons, people often neglected his thought of induction and regarded him as a pure rationalist. This view is unfair. Leibniz’s account of induction is widely scattered in many of his books and manuscripts. Leibniz shows a tendency to eclecticism in inductive defenses. He confines his inductive rationality to occasional hesitation. Rationality relies on some metaphysical universal hypothesis principles, which not only emphasize the necessity of empirical induction for obtaining truth, but also take a rationalist defense approach. Leibniz puts forward 'the conjectural method a priori' in his induction and defense-the embryonic form of hypothetico-deductive method, shining the light of modern scientific spirit and leaving a place for empirical exploration in the grand metaphysical system.