意识的统一性何以可能?

How is Unity of Consciousness Possible?

"意识的统一性"是当代认知哲学和脑科学中一个颇有争议的论题,但不可否认它是理解意识现象的关键。随着认知神经科学的发展,尤其是对割裂脑病人的研究,发现了意识统一性的反例,对意识本质上具有一致性通道的主张产生了质疑。由于大脑模块间的知觉内容不一,且涉及不同模块性的视觉和触觉经验需要不同类型的表征内容,认知科学家赫尔利从副现象论对统一意识观点做了修正,试图通过意识的局部统一性建立物理主义框架下的意识统一性论题。然而,从认知哲学的视角看,无论是统一性论题的反例,还是副现象论的修正,都不足以驳倒意识的统一性论题,根本原因在于我们直觉上感觉意识是整体感知世界的,但这种直觉还缺乏确凿的经验证据支持。

It has been traditionally held that consciousness has unity access, but more and more scholars have questioned this view, because the visual sense has its own content, the tactile sense also has its own, and the pattern of multi-perception seems to have inconsistency. It seems that different modules of visual and tactile experience have different content. When experiences for multi-perceptual modularity are different, then the intentionality of the object is not the same. Epiphenomenalism has become more and more popular in cognitive science as the unity of consciousness came under growing criticism. So a 'local'(rather than global) concept of unity will help to establish a thesis of unity of consciousness cohering with physicalism.