知觉表征论的难题

The Puzzle of Representationalism

知觉表征论主张知觉经验具有表征内容,且经验的现象特征被表征内容所穷尽。这反过来将意味着,如果现象特征不变,那么表征内容也不变。由于知觉表征论的这一特性,它与内容外在论、感受质内在论三者不兼容。体现这种不兼容难题的一个示例是反转地球思想实验。本文对不兼容难题、反转地球实验进行分析,对表征论者作出的不同回应进行探讨,指出这些回应并不令人满意。这一现状提示出一条理论路径:搁置知觉表征论,而转向一种更审慎的理论出发点——弱意向论。

Representationalism of perception claims that perceptual experience has representational content,and that the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by the representational content. This means, as is shown by some analysis, if the phenomenal character does not change, the representational content does not change either. A challenge to representationalism consists in the inconsistency of representationalism, content externalism and qualia internalism. One illustration of this puzzle is the Inverted Earth thought experiment. In this paper, I will elaborate on the puzzle, discuss the thought experiment and some important responses to it, and indicate that these responses are not satisfactory. The failure of solving the puzzle suggests a more scrutinized approach: weak intentionalism.