摘要
延展心灵假说在过去二十年挑战了认知科学主流的颅内主义认知观,认为心灵/认知并不仅发生在脑内,而是可以延展到环境中与一些物理设备构建起耦合系统。然而,关于延展心灵的见解,却因为我们对于心灵、认知以及脑的概念的内涵和关系理解的含混,导致语词含义摆荡在认知神经科学与哲学两端。本文试图通过概念梳理,反驳颅内主义认知标志观,厘清脑与心灵/认知的基本特征和属性,并最终认为可以通过区分"作为器官的脑"和"发生功能的脑"消解这种"语词之争",为延展认知研究的概念可能提供基础。
In the last twenty years,the hypothesis of extended mind has been challenging the cognitive view of intracranialism which is the mainstream of cognitive science,claiming that mind/cognition does not locate in the brain,but extends beyond skin and skull,and co-constructs into a coupled cognitive system with devices in the environment.However,because of the vagueness of definition among mind,cognition and brain,our understanding about extended mind oscillates between the area of cognitive neuroscience and philosophy.This paper is intended to re-examine the foundation of concepts,argues against intracranialism,and enhances the foundation of possibility for extended mind by distinguishing the concepts of the brain as an organ and the functioning brain.
作者
朱林蕃
赵猛
ZHU Linfan;ZHAO Meng(Department of Philosophy,Peking University,Beijing,100871;Faculty of Humanities,University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing,102488)
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期1-8,共8页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社科基金重大项目"基于信息技术哲学的当代认识论研究"(项目编号:15ZDB019)子课题"信息技术介入的认识本质研究"的阶段性研究成果
关键词
延展心灵
具身认知
颅内主义
发生功能的脑
Extended mind
Embodied cognition
Intracranialism
The functioning brain
