摘要
无奇迹论证作为科学实在论的主要论证包含了一个潜在的推理:如果一个理论做出了成功的预测,那么这足以说明该理论的真理性。然而,历史上无数的例子表明,基于理论的预测成功而被当作真理性的东西,在后来证明是错误的。为了应对这一历史性的挑战,实在论者对这一推理形式进行了诸多修改。目前有可能的辩护形式包括结构实在论的观点和强调证实的理论。但是结构实在论在一些关键的概念上还存在争议,同时由于是一种很强的选择性实在论立场而让许多实在论者难以接受。证实的方法虽然能够解决历史的反例带来的问题,但同时也带来了一些非历史的难题。
The No-miracle argument as the main argument of scientific realism contains a potential inference:if a theory made a successful prediction,then it is sufficient to explain the truth of the theory.Umpteen examples of history,however,show that theory that are treated as truth based on the success of theoretical predictions have later proved to be wrong.In order to meet this historic challenge,the realists have modified much to this inference.The possible forms of defense currently include structural realism and theories that emphasis confirmation.But structural realism is controversial in some key concepts,and it is also difficult for some realists to accept for its strong realist position.While the method of confirmation has the opportunity to get rid of the impact of historical counter-examples,it also presents some non-historical difficulties.
作者
张运
李宏芳
ZHANG Yun;LI Hongfang(School of Philosophy,Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei,430000)
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期30-35,共6页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
关键词
科学实在论
无奇迹论证
历史的反例
结构实在论
证实的方法
Scientific realism
No-miracle argument
Historical counter-examples
Structure realism
Confirmation theory