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证言知识反个体主义 被引量:2

Anti-Individualism of Testimonial Knowledge
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摘要 通过接受他人话语(证言)而形成的信念何以能够成为知识?个体主义认为证言本身并不具有为认知主体提供知识保证的特殊地位,证言知识完全由接受证言的个体内在的认知能力和认知资源提供辩护和保证。反个体主义则主张证言知识不能完全由个体内在的因素所说明,而是有着外在的维度,接受证言的个体所处的特定社会环境状况是其知识保证的必要构成条件,信念的合理性是在社会中分布扩散的。证言知识的反个体主义将知识视为个体与社会共同参与构建的认知成果,这种观点能够避免理性还原论在解释日常知识上的困难,缓和德性认识论在说明证言知识时所面对的个人与社会之间的张力,并且为科学知识的三大特征提供解释,有利于创建一种互利型的知识理论。 How can a true belief based on other’s words(testimony)be knowledge?Individualists refute that testimony itself can support any special warrant for the epistemic agent’s knowledge,and maintain that testimonial knowledge gains its justification and warrant fully from epistemic abilities and resources internal to the individual who accepts the testimony.In contrast,anti-individualists argue that testimonial knowledge cannot be fully explicated by the individual’s internal factors,but has an external dimension.The specific state of the social environment which the individual hearer is in is a necessary constitutive condition of the warrant of his testimonial knowledge,for the rationality of a testimonial belief is socially diffusive.Anti-individualism of testimonial knowledge regards knowledge as an epistemic achievement constructed by the participation of the individual and society together,which can avoid the difficulty of reductionism in explaining common knowledge,relax the tension between individual and society faced by virtue epistemology in explaining testimonial knowledge,provide explanations for the three important features of scientific knowledge,and help us construct a mutually beneficial type of knowledge theory.
作者 蔡海锋 CAI Haifeng(Department of Philosophy,College of Humanities,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian,361005)
出处 《自然辩证法通讯》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第7期51-59,共9页 Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“认知哲学研究”(项目编号:13JZD004) 第62批中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目“知识论反个体主义研究”(项目编号:2017M622085)
关键词 证言知识 个人 社会 反个体主义 Testimonial knowledge Individual Society Anti-Individualism
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