突发公共事件应急管理双重委托代理博弈分析

Analysis of dual client-agency game in emergency management of abrupt public events

为了防止突发公共事件应急管理中的道德风险,提高应急管理的效率,减少损失,运用委托代理理论,分析了灾民、政府、非政府组织间的双重委代理关系及其特点,并计算了政府与非政府组织间委托代理关系下的最优激励水平与努力水平。结果表明,在第一层委托代理关系中,由于委托权虚化和代理人刚性问题,很难通过契约和一般意义上的激励防止道德风险;在第二层委托代理关系中,非政府组织的努力程度与激励强度成正比,与成本系数成反比。因此,必须增加政府激励强度,加大第三方的监督力度,同时将应急管理工作成效纳入政府官员考核体系,选择成本系数小的非政府组织作为政府的委托对象。

In order to prevent moral hazard in the public events emergency management,improve the management efficiency and reduce losses,this paper uses client-agent theory to analyze the dual client-agent relationships and its characteristics among the victims,government and NGO,and calculate the optimal incentive level and effort level between government and NGO. The results show that,in the first grade of client-agent relation,due to the false client right and rigid agents,it is difficult to prevent the risk of moral hazard through contracts and general incentive; in the second grade of client-agent relation,the NGO's efforts degree is proportional to excitation intensity and is inversely proportional to the cost coefficient. Therefore,governmental excitation intensity and the supervision of third party must be increased. Meanwhile,the emergency management effectiveness should be brought into the government officers' appraisal system,and the NGO with lower cost coefficient should be selected as the government's agency object.