中国国有上市公司股权制衡度、管理层激励与公司绩效的实证分析

An Empirical Analysis of Equity Restriction Ratio, Management Incentives and Performance of Chinese State-owned Listed Companies

本研究基于管理层权力理论、委托代理理论,实证检验了我国国有上市公司的股权制衡度对管理层激励的影响,以及在高度制衡和制衡不足的公司中股权制衡度对管理层激励效果的影响分析。研究发现,国有上市公司中股权制衡度越高,管理层薪酬激励、股权激励程度越高;在股权制衡不足的国有上市公司中,股权制衡度能显著提升管理层股权激励效果,并且比高度制衡的公司效果更显著;股权制衡度对管理层薪酬激励促进效果比较微弱。本研究的结果为国有上市公司改革提出了理论依据以及管理启示。

Based on the management behavior theory and principal-agent theory, this study empirically tests the impact of the equity restriction ratio of state-owned listed companies on management incentives, and the impact of the equity restriction ratio on management incentives in state-owned listed companies with different checkand-balance of ownership. The study found that the equity restriction ratio is positively correlated with the degree of management compensation incentives and management equity incentives. The equity restriction ratio can signi?cantly improve the effect of management equity incentives in state-owned listed companies with low checkand-balance of ownership, and it works better in the low check-and-balance of ownership than in the high one. The effect of equity restriction ratio on management compensation incentives is relatively weak. The results of this study provide theoretical basis and management implications for the reform of state-owned listed companies.