维特根斯坦的现象学之谜

The Puzzle of Wittgenstein's Phenomenology

尽管对于欧陆现象学运动知之甚少 ,维特根斯坦还是在他于 1 92 9年年初重返剑桥之际独立地提出了一个他自己的“现象学”版本。他的现象学观可以被归结为这样一个信条 :用一种所谓的“现象学语言”来再现被直接给予的现象乃是可能的 ,而同样的任务则是日常—物理语言所无法胜任的。但通过对于“予料”之本性的深入探索 ,维氏最后却不得不承认了 :再现直接经验的任何尝试都会不可避免地牵涉到物理语言的表达式 ,而这种牵涉恰恰是以牺牲现象学语言的独立性为代价的。这一发现最终导致了维氏对于现象学的放弃。

Despite the fact that he knew little about the continental phenomenological movement, Ludwig Wittgenstein developed his own edition of 'Phenomenology' as soon as he returned to Cambridge at the beginning of 1929. His conception of phenomenology lies in his belief in the possibility of establishing a so-called 'phenomenological language' to represent the immediately given phenomena, which could be hardly described by the ordinary physical language. Nevertheless, his further exploration of the nature of the 'data' forced him to acknowledge that any attempt to realize the representation of immediate experience would inevitably involve the expressions of the physical language at the cost of the independence of the phenomenological language. This discovery made him abolish the idea of phenomenology eventually.