治理监督机制对中国上市公司过度投资行为的影响研究——论代理理论的适用性

Study on Impact of Governance Supervision Mechanism on Overinvestment of China's Listed Companies:The Applicability of Agent Theory

本文突破委托代理理论,以控制幻觉理论为基础,从管理者过度自信的视角分析并检验了公司治理的内部监督机制对过度投资行为的影响路径。研究结果表明:管理者过度自信是过度投资行为产生的重要原因之一;董事长总经理两职分离显著抑制了过度投资行为,这种影响一方面来自于对机会主义行为的抑制,另一方面来自控制幻觉的减弱,缓解了管理者过度自信;独立董事对过度投资行为存在直接的抑制作用;董事会规模及股权集中度对过度投资行为不存在抑制作用。本文的研究深化了对公司治理基本功能的解读,完善了公司治理影响企业投资决策的内在机理,有助于上市公司治理机制的改革和完善以及资本配置效率的提升。

Based on the illusion control theory,this research makes a breakthrough on principal-agent theory. From the perspective of managerial overconfidence,we analyze and test how supervision mechanism of company influences over-investment. The results of the study show that: managerial overconfidence is one of the important reasons for excessive investment behavior; the separation of Chairmen of the board and general manager significantly inhibits excessive investment behavior. This kind of impact results from two possible factors: inhibition of opportunism behavior and the abatement of illusion control which eases the managerial overconfidence; independent directors have a direct inhibitory effect on overinvestment behavior; the size of the board and ownership concentration don't inhibit the excessive investment behavior. This paper deepens the interpretation of company management's basic functions and improves inner mechanism of a company's investment decision influenced by corporate governance,which would be very helpful to the reformation and improvement of a listed company's governance mechanism and promotion of the efficiency of capital allocation.