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2014年度诺贝尔经济科学奖获得者Jean Tirole研究工作评述 被引量:1

A Survey and Comment on the Work of Jean Tirole——Nobel Prize Winner in Economic Sciences in 2014
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摘要 2014年度的诺贝尔经济科学奖授予法国学者Jean Tirole教授,以表彰其对市场势力和规制的研究。Tirole以博弈论为主要工具,研究宏观经济、企业管理、社会发展等问题,开辟了若干新的研究领域和方向,例如新产业组织理论与新规制经济学等,这些成果推动了博弈论在经济学和管理学中的应用,丰富了博弈论的研究内容,具有里程碑意义的学术贡献。本文对Tirole的主要学术成就进行梳理,总结获奖成就对现有研究的启示,并提出了一些值得关注的研究方向和科学问题,希望能推动中国相关领域的理论研究与应用研究。 The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences decided to award the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 2014 to Jean Tirole for his analysis of market power and regulation. Using game theory as the main tool,Tirole studied the issues of macro economy,enterprise management and social development,and created a series of new research fields. These achievements are significant both theoretically and practically in that they promoted the application of game theory in economics and management and established the status of the game theory in economics and management. This paper summarizes the academic contribution of Tirole,and proposes some research directions and problems worthy of attention.
作者 胡毅 乔晗
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第11期3-11,共9页 Management Review
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71373262 71003057 71301160)
关键词 Jean Tirole 诺贝尔经济科学奖 市场势力 规制 博弈论 Jean Tirole,the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel,market power,regulation,game theory
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参考文献2

  • 1Jean‐CharlesRochet,JeanTirole.Two‐sided markets: a progress report[J].The RAND Journal of Economics.2010(3)
  • 2Jean‐CharlesRochet,JeanTirole.PLATFORM COMPETITION IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS[J].Journal of the European Economic Association.2010(4)

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