代理问题、公司治理与企业成本粘性——来自我国制造业企业的经验证据

The Agency Problem,Corporate Governance,and the Cost Stickiness:Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Listed Firms

成本粘性是成本的一种重要特征,企业生存和发展面临着经济风险,成本粘性程度过高会降低经营效率、加剧经营风险。本文将委托代理理论引入对成本粘性问题的研究,在控制了企业自身经济特征以及宏观经济周期性变化等因素后发现,代理问题是加重成本粘性程度的重要原因。具体来说,CEO的任期、更替、薪酬结构和企业自由现金流水平对企业的成本粘性程度都会产生显著影响;在较强的公司治理环境中,代理问题对成本粘性的影响会显著减弱。在进一步分析中,本文按照企业的生命周期进行分组检验后发现,成熟期企业比成长期企业的成本粘性程度更高;且相比企业自身经济特征,代理问题对成熟期企业成本粘性程度的影响更加显著。本文为"代理观"解释成本粘性现象提供经验证据,为区分宏观经济因素、企业自身经济特征等基本因素和代理因素对成本粘性程度形成不同程度的影响、提高企业效率和资源配置能力提供合理建议。

Cost stickiness is one of the asymmetrical behaviors of cost. Due to the economic risk,excess cost stickiness may reduce the firm operating efficiency and increase the firm risk. The paper applies agency theory on the research of cost stickiness,and examines how the agency problem affects the cost stickiness. We find that cost stickiness is positively associated with managers' empire building incentives due to the agency problem,as measured by CEO tenure,horizon,fixed compensation and FCF. We also find that the positively association between the agency problem and cost stickiness is more pronounced under weak corporate governance. And through the additional analysis,we provide preliminary but more direct evidence that the agency problem shifts cost stickiness from its optimal level dictated by economic factors.