固定管理费率制度下的基金激励契约设计

The Incentive Contract Design of Fund with Fixed Management Fee Rate

固定管理费率制度在目前证券市场不景气的现状下已严重影响了中国基金产业的健康发展。本文对基于固定费率+激励制度+风险分担机制的基金管理费收取契约模式进行了探讨。文中将基金管理费分成基金日常运营费用、业绩报酬两部分分别结算,前者可直接计提,后者则参照业绩比较基准进行确定,且两部分费用依照风险共担系数由基金投资人与基金管理人共同承担。该契约模型在市场不景气的情况下可有效解决双方的利益冲突,并可应对基金管理人的道德风险问题。业绩报酬与日常运营费用分别计算使得基金管理人有积极性降低基金的日常运营成本并使成本费用内部化,基金管理人也尽其可能的运作基金以减少赔偿支付。风险共担机制的引入使得基金管理人尽量保持风险规避的投资策略,减少了基金管理人迎合基金投资人的风险偏好而独自承担基金运营的预期风险损失。

Fixed management fee rate has seriously hindered the healthy development of Chinese fund industry in the recessionary stock market. In this paper,we discuss the fund management fee contract mode combining with fixed fee,incentive income and risk sharing.Fund management fee is divided into two settlement parts: daily operating expenses of fund,payment for fund manager's performance.The former can directly be accrued,the latter can be confirmed by reference to the fund performance benchmark. The fund investor and the fund manager can bear the two parts of costs in accordance with the risk sharing coefficient. It can effectively resolve the interest conflict of both sides in the downturn market,and deal with the fund manager's moral hazard problem. Consequently,fund manager has the passion to lower and internalize fund daily expenses,furthermore he will operate the fund as far as possible. Introduction of the risk sharing mechanism in this paper makes the fund manager keep the risk aversion investment strategy,and reduces the expected loss of fund manager who only cares about the investors' risk preference with the performance incentive.