双重金字塔结构、国有资产监督管理效率与国企绩效

Dual Pyramidal Structures,State-owned Assets Supervision Efficiency and SOEs' Performance

从国有上市公司中独有的双重金字塔结构角度,本研究考察各级国有资产监督管理机构对上市公司的监督管理效率。结合2004到2009年度上市公司数据,本研究指出金字塔式的国有资产委托监管体系扭曲了作为实际控制人的国有股出资人代表的治理行为,损害国有资产监管效率。本研究还通过估计金字塔式的国有资产委托监管体系对实际控制人的治理行为的影响程度来评价各级国有资产监督管理机构的监管效率,结果依然表明与非国有上市公司的资产管理效率相比,各级国有资产监管机构的资产监管效率均有不同程度的降低。

This study focuses on the state-owned assets supervision efficiency from the perspective of dual pyramidal structures in stateowned listed firms. Using the data from 2004 to 2009,this study points out that pyramidal state-owned assets supervision system distorts the state- owned assets supervision agencies' governance behaviors and decreases supervision efficiency. Also,this study evaluates the supervision efficiency of agencies through studying the effects of pyramidal state-owned assets supervision structures on the governance behaviors of real controlling shareholders. Compared with the efficiency of privately owned firms,this study finds out that efficiency of SOEs controlled by different administrative level of supervision agencies is not relatively efficient.