机构投资者异质性、投资期限与公司盈余管理

The Heterogeneity of Institutional Investors,the Investment Horizon and Earnings Management

从机构投资者的投资期限与上市公司的会计盈余信息关系视角,分析不同投资期限的机构投资者在公司治理中的作用。使用Gaspar等指标,把机构投资者分为长期机构投资者和短期机构投资者,利用我国上市公司2003-2011年数据,实证检验了机构投资者的投资期限对盈余管理的影响。结果发现:与预期一致,长期机构投资者的持股比例越高,越能体现其公司治理效应,即与盈余管理及正向盈余管理显著负相关;短期机构投资者比例越高,越能体现其投资的短视行为,即与盈余管理及正向盈余管理显著正相关。长期机构投资占优和短期机构投资占优分别体现其公司治理效应和信息交易效应,说明只有长期机构投资者才能参与公司治理、改善公司治理结构。因此,提高长线机构投资者的持股比例和建立长线机构投资者的激励机制才是当务之急。

This paper analyzes the role of different maturities institutional investors in corporate governance from the perspective of the relationship between investment horizon of institutional investors and accounting earnings information of listed companies. Institutional investors are classified by the methods of Gaspar et al(2006) into two types: long-term and short-term. Using the 2003- 2011 data,this paper examines what impact the investment horizon of institutional investors has on earnings management. The results show that consistent with expectations,the higher holdings proportion of long-term institutional investors,the more it can reflect the corporate governance effect; the higher holdings proportion of short-term institutional investors,the more short-sighted they are. Whether a company is dominated by long-term institutional investors or short-term institutional investors has different reflection of corporate governance effect and information transaction effect. In short,only long-term institutional investors as participants in corporate governance can improve the corporate governance structure. Therefore,increasing the stake of long- term institutional investors and creating incentives for long-term institutional investors are the top priority.