经理人特征、管理层防御与长期资产减值政策选择

A Study of Manger Features,Management Entrenchment,and Impairment of Long-term Asset Policy

经理人特征会引起管理层防御,从而影响企业长期资产减值政策。本文以2007-2011年度沪深两市所有制造业上市公司的数据为研究样本,以经理人自身特征作为切入点,实证检验了不同经理人特征引致管理层防御行为对企业会计政策选择的影响作用。结果表明:上市公司经理人特征对长期资产减值会计政策的选择会有显著影响,但各因素影响程度不同,经理人是否兼任、薪酬、持股和年龄这四个因素与长期资产减值会计政策的运用水平之间的相关性最为显著,而经理任期和学历未能通过相关性检验,影响并不显著。本文对于深入了解经理管理防御的动因,解释长期资产减值政策选择影响因素具有参考价值。

Manger's characteristics may induce management entrenchment,thus exerting an impact on the impairment of long-term asset policy. The study adopts the data arising from the listed manufacturers on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets during the period from 2007 to 2011,taking manger's features as the breakthrough point,then conducts an empirical analysis of the effect of managerial entrenchment behavior induced by manger's characteristics on the choice of accounting strategies in enterprise. The results demonstrate that manger's individual features have significantly impacted the impairment of long-term asset policy,but the degree of influence by each factor is discrepant. Whether holding more than one position,pay,stock-holding,and age are strongly correlated with the level at which an accounting strategy for long-standing asset value reduction is utilized,while tenure and educational background are not so correlated that they cannot pass the test,The study provides a reference for further probing into management entrenchment motives and explaining influencing factors in making a decision concerning a long-term asset reduction policy.