互惠性偏好视角下农产品供应链金融的4PL对3PL的激励策略研究

Incentive Mechanism between 4PL and 3PL Considering Reciprocal Preference in Agricultural Product Supply Chain Finance

农产品供应链金融是供应链金融业务的拓展和理论延伸。以业务中第四方物流(fourth party logisitics,4PL)与第三方物流(third party logisitics,3PL)委托代理关系为研究对象,运用委托代理理论,结合行为经济学家Rabin提出的互惠性偏好理论,本文构建了植入互惠性偏好的非利润指标委托代理模型,并从确定性收入溢价为常数及确定性收入溢价与固定支付为函数关系两个方面,研究了第四方物流与第三方物流的契约设计问题。研究发现,引入互惠性偏好后,第四方物流对第三方物流表现友善时,第三方物流会更加努力工作,且第三方物流互惠性偏好越强,其努力程度越强;第四方物流给予相同固定支付时,互惠性偏好越强的第三方物流付出的努力数量越多,此时第四方物流获得的收益越多。

Agricultural product supply chain finance is the business expansion and theoretical extension of supply chain finance. Regarding principal-agent relationship between the fourth party logistics( 4 PLs) and the third party logistics( 3 PLs) as the research object,using the principal-agent theory,this paper constructs a non-profit index principal-agent model considering the reciprocal preference and studies the contract design between 4 PLs and 3 PLs from two aspects. Results show that 3 PLs will increase some extra effort in return when 4 PLs gives higher reward. When 4 PLs offer the same extra fixed payment,and the stronger the sense of 3 PLs’ reciprocal preference is,the more 3 PLs increases extra effort,the more profit 4 PLs obtain.