所有制混合能促进企业创新吗?——基于委托代理冲突与股东间冲突的整合视角

Can Mixed Ownership Improve Firm Innovation?——An Integrated Perspective of Principal-Agent Conflicts and Principal-Principal Conflicts

混合所有制已成为国企改革的关键突破口,但也将管理者推向了窘境:股权集中容易引发股东间冲突,而股权分散又会产生委托代理问题,本文从创新视角为国企改革寻求新思路。基于整合的委托代理冲突与股东间冲突视角,本文剖析并检验了所有制混合与创新绩效的关系,在此基础上考察了企业性质和制度发展水平的调节效应。结果发现:无论从混合深度还是混合广度来说,所有制混合均能够显著提高企业创新绩效;在国企与非国企中,所有制混合深度对创新绩效的影响并无明显差异,而非国企中所有制混合广度对创新绩效的积极作用比国企更强;在制度发展水平较高地区,所有制混合对创新绩效具有更强的积极作用。本文不仅有助于进一步丰富代理理论和公司治理理论,而且为国企改革路径选择和公司治理机制完善提供了实践启示。

Mixed ownership has become a key breakthrough in the reform of state-owned enterprises,while this spontaneously pushes managers into a dilemma.Concentrated ownership would easily lead to principal-principal conflicts,while dispersed ownership might bring serious principal-agent problems.Therefore,this paper seeks some new train of thoughts for the reform from the perspective of innovation.Based on the integration of principal-agent conflicts and principal-principal conflicts,this paper analyzes and tests the relationship between mixed ownership and innovation performance,and examines the moderating effect of the nature of the enterprise and the level of institutional development.The results show that the mixed depth and the mixed scope of ownership could significantly improve the innovation performance.From the viewpoint of mixed depth,there are no significant differences between state-owned enterprises(SOEs)and non-state-owned enterprises(NSOEs),while from the perspective of mixed scope,the relationship between mixed ownership and innovation performance became stronger in NSOEs.In the high level of institutional development,the effect of mixed ownership on innovation performance is stronger than in the low level.This study not only enriches the agency theory,but also provides some new inspirations for the path selection of SOEs reform and the improvement of corporate governance mechanisms.