摘要
本研究试图回答地方政府行为对地区福利和环境保护的影响效应,是双重性兼顾还是选择性偏废?引入了兼顾低碳和民生的碳福利绩效概念,利用1990-2014年中国省级动态面板数据,构建聚类稳健双向固定效应模型和系统广义矩估计模型进行实证检验,探究了地方政府行为对碳福利绩效影响机理,尝试从一个新的角度来解读地方政府行为对低碳和民生的综合影响。研究结果表明:政府间竞争导致区域环境质量恶化的同时兼顾地区福利水平提高,对地区福利的促进效应大于对碳排放的影响效应,有助于推动碳福利绩效提升;政府规模扩张在导致区域环境质量恶化的同时忽视地区福利水平提高,不利于推动碳福利绩效提升;政府间竞争和政府规模扩张对碳福利绩效的共同影响作用上存在"互补关系",该结论为"污染天堂"假说和"逐底竞争"理论的有效性提供了经验证据。进一步研究发现,政府间竞争和政府规模扩张对碳福利绩效的影响效应存在明显区域异质性,东部地区的政府间竞争比政府规模扩张对碳福利绩效的影响程度更大,中部和西部地区的政府间竞争比政府规模扩张对碳福利绩效的影响程度更小。建议加强中央政府对地方政府行为的监督和激励,制定兼顾环境保护和福利提升双重目标的区域发展差异化政策,积极搭建以提高地区碳福利绩效为导向的官员晋升顶层设计,构建生态文明体系,推进人与自然和谐共生。
In an attempt to explain the effect of local government behavior on both regional welfare and environmental protection and find out whether it is dual consideration or selective neglect,this study introduces the concept of carbon welfare performance and empirically analyzes the dynamic data of Chinese provinces from 1990 to 2014 via a robust clustering two-way fixed effect model and a generalized method of moments model to research the effect of local government behavior on carbon welfare performance.We try to interpret,from a new perspective,what impacts the behaviors of local governments bring to low carbon performance and people’s livelihood.The results from data regression indicate that the intergovernmental competition leads to the deterioration of the regional environmental quality but also the improvement of regional welfare,and regional welfare is improved more significantly than carbon emission is affected,thus contributing to the promotion of carbon welfare performance.Government scale expansion not only leads to the deterioration of the regional environmental quality but also leave regional welfare ignored,thus counteracting the promotion of carbon welfare performance.Both intergovernmental competitions and governmental scale expansion have a'complementary relationship'to the collective effects of carbon welfare performance,which provides empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the'pollution paradise'hypothesis and the theory of'bottom competition'.Further study concludes that there is a significant regional heterogeneity in the effects of intergovernmental competition and government scale expansion on carbon welfare performance.The intergovernmental competition has a greater impact on the performance of the carbon welfare than the government scale expansion in the eastern region,yet the impact of intergovernmental competition between the central and western regions is weaker than that of the government scale expansion.This paper suggests that the promotion mechanism of performance-oriented officials based on the regional carbon welfare performance,and the encouragement and supervision to local government should be strengthened from the central government and the government should formulate regional development policies that take into account the dual objectives of environmental protection and welfare promotion,and build an ecological civilization system and promote harmonious development between mankind and the nature.
作者
王垒
赵忠超
刘新民
Wang Lei;Zhao Zhongchao;Liu Xinmin(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590)
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第4期263-282,共20页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71371111)
国家级大学生创新训练计划项目(201710424053)
教育部人文社科规划项目(17YJC630154)
山东省自然科学基金博士基金(ZR2016GB07)
山东科技大学科研创新团队"组织治理与系统决策"项目(2015TDJH103)
山东科技大学人才引进科研启动基金资助项目(2017RCJJ1019)
2018年度青岛市社会科学规划研究项目(QDSKL1801128)
关键词
碳福利绩效
政府间竞争
政府规模扩张
碳排放
地区福利
carbon welfare performance
intergovernmental competition
government scale expansion
carbon emission
local welfare