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企业信用的现代经济学分析 被引量:1

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摘要 传统经济学在分析问题时有严格的假设条件,故企业信用问题并不在其分析的视野中。但随着经济学理论的发展,这些假设前提被逐渐放宽。于是,现代经济学中的交易成本理论、博弈理论、信息不对称理论等为企业信用问题提供了一个很好的解释框架。本文对此展开了论述。
出处 《中外企业家》 2012年第4X期48-49,共2页 Chinese and Foreign Entrepreneurs
基金 江苏省2010年度高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目:江苏农村金融生态的研究:[批准号:2010ZDIXM031]研究成果之一
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