网络扩展激励研究:以输电网络为例

Incentives in Network Expansion:With Examples from Grid

以输电网络为例 ,本文主要研究网络扩展中的激励问题。我们发现 ,不对称信息将导致扩展容量向下扭曲。而垂直一体化结构是否导致网络扩展容量扭曲则取决于该公司是否获得传输拥塞契约 (TCC)支付 :如果公司没有获得TCC支付 ,则其扩展容量肯定存在向下扭曲 ,而如果公司获得了TCC支付 ,则是否存在扭曲不确定。本文还研究了输电网络扩展的市场机制 ,结果表明 ,市场机制的效率和网络互联现状、电力需求弹性以及公共资金影子成本直接相关。

With Examples from Grid,In This paper,we focus on the incentive problems in network expansion.We found that incomplete information and collusion between network companies will distort the expansion capacity,but the affect of the vertical integration is uncertain.If the company gets TCC payment,the distortion of expansion capacity is uncertain,if not,there will be download distortion.We also proble into the merchant mechanism in the Grid expansion,and found that the efficiency of this mechanism correlates directly with the Grid interconnection status quo,demand elasticity and the social cost of the public fund.