摘要
本文考察了在收益递增条件下产生重复建设和区域经济分割的根源。由于发达地区在高技术产业拥有比较优势 ,且通常具有较快的技术进步速度 ,所以往往在贸易利益的分享中得到了较大的份额。而落后地区如果选择暂时不加入分工体系 ,它将失去当期分工的收益 ,但却可以提高自己在未来分配分工收益的谈判中的地位 ,甚至可能实现对发达地区的赶超。落后地区的战略性行为虽然在一定条件下对于其自身是有利的 ,但却造成了社会总产出减少和资源配置效率的损失。中央政府的财政转移可以促使落后地区加入分工体系 ,这时 。
This paper has explored the causes of duplicative industries and interregional economic segmentation with increasing return. In a market economy, the better-developed region has comparative advantage in high-tech industries and higher speed of technological progress, and consequently a higher position and a larger share in interregional bargaining to distribute the benefits of regional specialization. If the less-developed region does not specialize, it will lose the benefits of regional specialization, but it might also gain a higher bargaining power in the future and even catch up the rich region. The higher is the technological level of better-developed region, the higher is its speed of technological progress, the higher is its bargaining power, and the more beneficial is it for the less-developed region to raise its bargaining power by developing “strategic' industries. Though under certain conditions it's self-beneficial for the less-developed region to behave strategically, it's socially inefficient because of loss in total production and allocative efficiency. We also find that fiscal transfer by the central government could induce the less-developed region to specialize, which means that fiscal transfer have both the functions of improving regional income distribution and the efficiency of resource allocation..
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第1期54-63,共10页
Economic Research Journal
基金
复旦大学文科科研"金苗计划"资助