水利水电建设的几个博弈问题研究

Study on some games in hydraulic and hydropower construction

在简单介绍博弈论的基础上,采用经典的囚徒困境、智猪博弈、斗鸡博弈和讨价还价等博弈模型,对我国水利水电建设中存在的博弈进行了模拟。博弈分析表明:以中央政府为主的传统投资机制难以实现资源最优配置;江河流域上、下游地方政府之间在水利水电工程建设协调问题上存在困难,需要中央政府的干预;水利水电建设项目的竞争和投资分摊问题,不仅关系到各参与人自身的经济理性和经济利益,而且是各参与人相互影响和相互作用的结果。

On the basis of a brief introduction of game theory, this paper incorporates classical game models such as Prisoners Dilemma, Boxed Pigs, Chicken Game and Bargaining Game to simulate the existing games in domain of hydraulic and hydropower construction in China. Game analyses show that the traditional investment arrangement relying on the central government is not able to achieve optimized resource allocation; the central government's intervention is necessary in coordinating the local governments, located at the upstream and the downstream; contention of engineering projects and apportionment of investment not only imply the conflict in economic benefit and rationalities of each participant himself, but also will be determined by interaction and influence among participants each other.