信息成本、分工授权和激励

Information Cost, Delegation and Incentive

由于信息生产成本,真正起作用的是激励代理人获取信息的约束。私利的存在,更束紧了这一约束。其结果是增加期望薪酬激励成本,这是私利的不利影响。不过,私利的存在也减少了代理人在没有获取足够信息的情况下报告项目不可行的动机,导致期望的薪酬激励成本减少,这是私利的有利影响。信息生产成本,私利影响的净效果决定了分工授权也就是项目论证和项目经营相分离与否。另外,对被否决项目的跟踪,也有助于降低激励成本。

The information acquisition constraints are really binding due to the cost of information production and even more for the presence of private benefits. This increases incentive costs and is a negative effect of private benefits. However, private benefits of control reduce the agent incentive to forecast a failure without enough information. This decreases incentive costs and is a positive effect of private benefits. The delegation, i.e., separation of project evaluation and project management, depends on the cost of information production and the net effect of private benefits. In addition, rejected projects that are followed up could also reduces incentive costs.