基于期权博弈理论的企业产品创新投资策略研究

On Product Innovation Investment Strategies of Enterprises Based on Option-Game Theory

通过运用期权博弈方法分析了双寡头企业产品创新战略的执行问题。将产品创新投资看作是企业持有的看涨期权,同时考虑其竞争对手的产品创新行为对其创新决策的影响,得到了两家企业在对称信息条件下的均衡执行战略,这个执行战略构成了子博弈精炼纳什均衡。在博弈的每一个结点,每家企业的执行战略都是在给定另一家企业执行战略的条件下的最优战略。依赖于初始条件,有一些均衡执行战略是序贯执行的,而另一些均衡执行战略是同时执行的。

This paper analyzes the exercise of duopoly option product innovation strategy with the theory of option-game. The authors obtain a pair of symmetric, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by regarding firm's product innovation investment as a call option which the firm holds while considering the impact of its competitor's innovation behavior. At each note, either firm's exercise strategies is optimal conditioning on the other's. Depending on the initial state, some equilibrium exercise strategies are sequential exercises, while others are simultaneous exercises.