摘要
寻租行为直接导致了证券监管的失灵 ,本文运用博弈论中“监督博弈”命题 ,来探讨监管者自身行为的成本和效益。并以亿安科技为案例对命题进行了实证研究。
Rent-seeking directly caused the malfunction of securities supervision. This paper applies the supervision on game from game theory to make research and discussion on the costs and benefits of supervisor himself. Meanwhile, the paper takes 'Yian Tech' case as an example to analyze and demonstrate this issue.
出处
《南昌航空工业学院学报（社会科学版）》
2003年第4期69-73,共5页
Journal of Nanchang Institute of Aeronautical Technology(Social Science)
关键词
监督博弈
证券监管
成本
效益
Game theory
Securities supervision
Cost
Benefit
