腐败生成、腐败传染与腐败遏制:一种博弈解释

Corruption Implementation, Corruption Infection and Corruption Containment: A Game Theory Analysis

腐败问题一直是政治学、行政学研究的热点话题 ,本文力求用博弈论作为一种解释途径。文章认为 ,腐败实际上并不是孤立的、静止的单个权力拥有者的行为 ,而往往是公共权力的授予者 (以监督者为代表 )与权力执行者 (以官员为代表 )之间 ,以及权力执行者 (官员 )之间的一次或多次博弈的结果。要遏制腐败 ,一方面要强化对监督者的监督以免使监督者“打盹” ,另一方面从外部环境上加大对各博弈方的奖惩力度 ,改变官员策略选择的收益值 ,形成新的“纳什均衡”解 。

The issue of corruption is the focal point in political and administrational inquiries, hence, this paper analyzes through a game theory perspective on corruption. It holds that the corruption is derived from the game between supervisors and bureaucrats and between any two bureaucrats. To contain the corruption requires the enforcement of supervision on supervisors and seeks a new Nash Equilibrium between the two bureaucrats by imposing a new punishment-award method to change the game player's loss and benefit.