农业产业化中地方政府与龙头企业的博弈分析

Game Analysis of the Function of Local Government and Leading Enterprise inAgricultural Industrialization

我国农业产业化发展处于初期阶段,政府在农业产业化中成为一个特殊的利益主体;特殊之处在于它追求双重利益(自身利益和地区利益)的实现。但由于信息不对称、以及政府效用短期化,使得政府与龙头企业间的博弈结果,呈现为政府利益与地区利益的不一致,对农业产业化发展造成不利影响。本文通过政府与龙头企业间的博弈模型来说明上述观点,并结合模型提出相应的建议。

The development of agricultural industrialization is still in initial stage,and government becomes a special principal part of benefit. It seeks double-benefit (self benefit and local benefit).But because information is asymmetric,and influeme of government is shorter,and government only pays attention to its benefit but ignore local benefit. The game result between local government and leading enterprise perhaps will bring disadvantageous effect on the development of agricultural industrialization. The article uses the way of game theory to analyses that, then brings up countermeasures.