政府对一类风险回避型垄断企业价格管制的激励机制设计与分析

An Incentive Mechanism Design and Analysis of Regulating of A Risk-Avoidable Monopolist

通过引入有关垄断企业成本的不对称信息,以政府和垄断企业为对象,研究委托代理框架下政府对风险回避的企业进行价格管制的机制设计问题,分析风险回避对最优机制的影响,度量风险回避度对于管制价格水平的扭曲。在成本参数服从均匀分布以及逆需求函数为线性的特定假设下,认为两种极端风险态度下管制价格、生产产量与成本参数的相关性是相同的。

Optimal mechanism design of regulating a risk-avoidable monopolist with principal-agent framework under the asymmetric information about cost is studied in this paper. We analyse the effect of risk avodeance to the optimal mechanism and qualify the impact of the avoidance level on pricing distortion. With a certain assumption, we conclude that the relationship between price level, quantity produced and cost parameter is same at both extreme levels of risk avoidance.