摘要
针对建筑市场中存在的隐藏知识和隐藏行为两类信息不对称现象,提出从信息传递机制和信用激励机制两个方面来建立建筑市场的信用机制,可使社会损失函数最小。并通过模型建立与分析,论证了建筑市场信用机制的合理性。
Because of the information that the entities of construction market have acquired during the process is asymmetric, the phenomenon of credit loss in construction market is quite gross. Focusing on the two kinds of asymmetric information, i.e. hidden knowledge and hidden action, this paper puts forward the suggestion of establishing credit mechanism in construction market in terms of establishing information deliver mechanism and credit incentive mechanism to make the total social loss and the direct cost of government least, through establishing and analysising the credit mechanism model of construction market, this essay proves the rationality of credit mechanism.
出处
《中南大学学报(社会科学版)》
2003年第4期508-511,共4页
Journal of Central South University:Social Sciences