公司期权制度与试用期组合机制——一个人力资源信息甄别博弈模型

A Game Theory Model on the Information Screen Effect of Compose of Option and Probation Period Mechanism

提出并证明试用期机制在公司选聘员工时具有一种信息甄别功能,它的优点是能对员工能力相差不大的情形进行信息甄别,克服了Spence文凭信息甄别机制的不足。还证明期权也具有一种信息甄别效应,同时还证明期权与试用期机制的组合能降低公司的甄别成本。还给出了公司试用期和期权与试用期组合机制设计的数学原理。

We have put forward a theory that the probation period mechanism have an information screening function when a company is inviting applications for job, which would be a supplement for the spence model. One of the merits of the model is that it could screen the informations of employee's capacity when there are fewer differences between the capacities of employees. This paper also has proved that option mechanism has a information screening effect and the compose of option and probation period mechanism could decrease the screen cost of a company. We have derived the mathematical Principles of probation period mechanism and the compose of option and probation period mechanism design in the paper.