政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束

Policy Burden,Moral Hazard and Soft Budget Constraint

本文在一个动态博弈的框架下 ,考察了政策性负担与转轨经济中企业的预算软约束问题。在信息不对称情况下 ,政策性负担将导致国有企业经理的道德风险 ,从而导致国有企业的低效率 ;当市场竞争达到一定程度时 ,政策性负担必然带来国有企业的预算软约束。而且 ,预算软约束同企业的公有制性质无关 ,在同样承担政策性负担的条件下 ,私有企业比国有企业更容易产生预算软约束 ,并且要求政府提供更多的补贴。当国有企业承担政策性负担时 。

We present a model of policy burden and soft budget constraint (SBC) that explains many stylized facts in socialist and transition economies. We find that under information asymmetry, policy burdens will lead to the moral hazards of the SOE managers and hence the low efficiency of SOEs; and when competition increases to certain degree, policy burdens will definitely result in the SBC problems. Privatization will not necessarily eradicate the SBCs of firms; on the contrary, a privatized firm with policy burdens will be more likely to bring the SBCs and ask for more subsidies from the state than a SOE under the same condition. We also show that in socialist and transition economies, when SOEs bear policy burdens, a restriction of the control power of SOE managers may improve the efficiency of SOEs and the social welfare.